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On August 16, 1961, C. Douglas Dillon, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, was at the Inter-American Economic and Social Conference in Punta del Este, Uru-
guay. !e conference had progressed without interruption until 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara—the revolutionary and Cuban Minister 
of Industry—gave a speech rebuking the United States, calling 
its policies imperialistic and its hemispheric objectives insidious.1 
Dillon had a hardline message in response: to acknowledge Gue-
vara’s speech would “betray the thousands of patriotic Cubans who 
are still awaiting and struggling for the freedom of their country.”2 
Dillon reiterated that the United States would not recognize Cas-
tro’s permanency.3 Hours later, Guevara had a message for Rich-
ard Goodwin, a member of the U.S. delegation: the revolution 
could not be defeated, but for economic reasons, Cuba sought a 
modus vivendi with the United States. As evidence of his sincerity, 
Guevara said Cuba would consider restitutions for expropriated 
property and reconsider its relationship with the Soviet Union.4 
Guevara’s encounter with Goodwin began a series of informal ne-
gotiations between Castro and the Kennedy administration. !is 
schizophrenic diplomatic moment illustrates that even as public 
U.S.-Cuban relations epitomized Cold War hostility, several unof-
ficial discussions about normalization call into doubt this inter-
pretive paradigm. !is essay examines such contradictory political 
moments. Despite the enmity and ideological gap between the two 
states, a series of informal exchanges shows that normalization was 
a distinct policy possibility in the early 1960s.
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!is essay will argue that successive U.S. administrations 
made decisions based on their effects on public image. Dreading 
the label of being “soft” on communism, successive administrations 
opted for the short-term benefits of oppositional politics rather 
than the long-term stability of normalization. What is more, these 
actions reflected cognitive dissonance: each president saw modus 
vivendi with Cuba as in the national interest, yet each felt it was 
his obligation as commander-in-chief to project symbolic strength. 
With the world believed to be in ideological stalemate between lib-
eral capitalism and communism, each president lived by a single 
foreign policy aphorism: any perceived failure by the United States 
was the Soviet Union’s gain. !us, U.S. presidents oscillated be-
tween aggression and negotiation. Castro also genuinely sought 
normalization. Time and again, Castro’s surrogates offered to nego-
tiate sacrosanct topics, including restitution for expropriated prop-
erty and the Cuban-Soviet alliance. !ese diplomatic openings 
challenge the conventional U.S. narrative, which portrays Castro as 
a Soviet proxy, instead revealing a reconciliatory and flexible head 
of state. While Cuba never ceased to be the proverbial thorn in the 
side of the United States, there was a brief moment when a durable 
peace was within reach. 
!e U.S.-Cuban Cold War relationship has fascinated his-
torians for decades. However, few academics have addressed Cas-
tro and the Kennedy administration’s attempts toward rapproche-
ment. Negotiations occurred in a climate of mutual distrust built 
over decades of patron-client interaction. Since the United States 
developed a preponderance of power in the nineteenth century, it 
had treated Latin America as its sphere of influence.5 !rough-
out the twentieth century, the United States undertook numerous 
military interventions in Cuba under the legal auspices of docu-
ments like the Platt Amendment, which reinforced U.S. imperial 
power.6 By the eve of the revolution, Cuba had become a locus for 
American corporate investment, exotic tourism, and growing local 
resentment.7 With the advent of the Cold War, this patron-client 
relationship was tested. Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States 
believed the !ird World to be integral to their national interest. 
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!is mentality perpetuated imperial modes of interaction as neo-
colonialism was re-imposed on the region.8  
In post-revolutionary Cuba, Fidel Castro’s anti-Americanism 
and the United States’ distrust of Latin American nationalists in-
tensified this prickly regional relationship.9 Cuban nationalists, 
such as Castro, cultivated fervent anti-U.S. worldviews to combat 
the “northern colossus,”10 thus representing a nationalist malignan-
cy towards the United States. During the Cold War, the respective 
doctrine of each U.S. president was devoted to the containment of 
global communism.11 Fearing communist “contagion” in the West-
ern Hemisphere, the U.S. abided by a policy of “no more Cubas” 
throughout the Cold War.12 However, counter to prevailing U.S. 
opinions, the U.S. government was initially fearful of Castro’s na-
tionalism rather than his Marxist-Leninism.13 Indeed, Castro al-
lied with the U.S.S.R. not because of any communist sympathies, 
but for the economic benefits of sugar markets and subsidized oil.14 
!us, hostile political decisions and historical memory, rather than 
rigid ideology, determined the international schism.. 
In orthodox Cold War narratives, Castro is portrayed as a 
Soviet proxy.15 However, Cuba retained its autonomy through-
out the Cold War.16 Castro turned to the Soviets for protection, 
but always sought independence in his foreign policy.17 Moreover, 
Castro’s paramount goal was the revolution’s survival, which meant 
that he would reach a cooperative pact if his existence depended on 
it.18 In this revisionist interpretation, an understanding between 
Cuba and the United States appeared plausible. 
On a theoretical level, one must also consider what condi-
tions make normalization achievable. Realists believe that all state 
decisions are made based on a rational analysis of a system’s balance 
of power. !is “cult of power” theory postulates that rapproche-
ment is nearly impossible because it violates a state’s central goal to 
maximize unilateral power.19  Liberal political scientists espouse 
democratic peace theory, claiming democracies that share institu-
tional constraints and ideological norms do not go to war with one 
another.20 Some liberal academics also support commercial peace 
theory, claiming that peace occurs when states build interconnected 
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economies through trade.21 !ese paradigms would conclude that 
cooperation does not emanate from diplomacy, but out of military 
power, political similarities, or economic interdependence. How-
ever, both liberal and realist arguments for durable peace neglect 
the importance of addressing past conflicts through normal diplo-
macy. Constructivists like Yinan He argue that in “deep interstate 
reconciliation,” formerly antagonist states must build a “relation-
ship cemented not only by shared short-run security needs but also 
by sustainable mutual understanding and trust” through standard 
diplomacy.22 !is paper will anchor its analysis on these construc-
tivist peace theories of diplomacy.
Political scientists have also shown that the American presi-
dency is inherently a symbolic position. !is paper will draw 
from Michael Grow’s “symbolic battlefield” thesis for its theoreti-
cal foundation.23 Unlike historians who claim that U.S. policy in 
Latin America was based exclusively on national security or eco-
nomic interest, Grow argues that policy had larger implications for 
U.S. presidents.24 For foreign policy professionals, challenges to 
U.S. superiority in Latin America undermined the United States’ 
international prestige and credibility. As a result, each president 
sought to project a hyper-cultivated image of “cold warrior” strong-
man. Grow grounds his argument in examples of coercive inter-
ventions that were “deliberate demonstration[s] to the world that 
U.S. power was not only credible but invincible.”25 As Grow and 
other authors have argued, each president was affected by symbolic 
influences such as electoral concerns, global political imagery, and 
personal vendettas.26 In Cuba specifically, Castro’s defiance took 
on particularly powerful symbolic meaning to the U.S. president, 
because his government had become a direct threat to U.S. power 
by transforming historically subservient Cuba into a regional in-
surgent.27 
While only a handful of authors have written on the specific 
topic of U.S.-Cuban normalization, none have utilized Grow’s po-
litical symbolism theory to ground their analysis. One school of 
authors led by Piero Gleijeses argues that normalization was never 
a possibility because Castro did not intend to negotiate honestly.28 
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Edward Gonzalez concurs with Gleijeses, writing that reconcilia-
tion would have required that Cuba abandon its international revo-
lutionary ethos in exchange for economic development—a decision 
Castro would have never made.29 Stephen Rabe and Richard Bis-
sel both argue that the United States would only accept full surren-
der by Castro.30 Finally, !omas Paterson and Louis Pérez con-
tend that the bitter experiences of the first years of the revolution 
tainted any negotiation thereafter.31 On the other hand, authors 
like Don Bohning, Archibald Ritter, and Daniel Erikson argue that 
reconciliation was possible after covert U.S. policy failed to elimi-
nate Castro.32 However, these arguments lack substantive analysis 
of the actual negotiations. Each scholar offers sweeping conclu-
sions without thoroughly analyzing the primary documents. Oth-
ers wrote their arguments before U.S. classified documents were 
revealed to the public.
!e preeminent scholar in the field of U.S.-Cuban rapproche-
ment is the National Security Archive’s Peter Kornbluh, who used 
the same top-secret agency documents as this essay in writing his 
forthcoming book, Talking With Fidel. In two articles for Cigar 
Aficionado, Kornbluh lays out four conclusions based on his analy-
sis of the Kennedy-Castro negotiations.33 Kornbluh states that 
Castro was intent on reconciliation with the United States but was 
never willing to alter Cuba’s domestic political conditions or its 
militant !ird World policies. Because of this intractable stance, 
Kornbluh also concludes that the “quid pro quo approach” could 
not work, as it left too much time for intervening forces to foil an 
agreement. Finally, Kornbluh determines that “moving quickly and 
unilaterally to lay the groundwork for better ties is likely to produce 
the best results.”34 Kornbluh’s conclusions are germane to normal-
ization theory, but do not address the greater meaning behind the 
diplomacy. !is paper will pursue the broader implications of these 
documents and this moment of diplomatic hope. 
From this literature, it becomes apparent that the Castro-
Kennedy negotiations remain largely overlooked. !is paper will 
shed light not only on the U.S.-Cuban relationship and the Cold 
War generally, but will offer a case study for policymakers working 
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on normalization in other contexts around the world. Moreover, 
the topic of rapprochement is still significant today. Even as the ide-
ological relevance of the Cold War recedes into history, anachronis-
tic U.S.-Cuban hostilities persist. In this modern context, how and 
why this glimmer of diplomatic hope in the 1960s was squandered 
demands further consideration. Only through additional study of 
this historical moment can conclusive solutions be sought.
In order to make these arguments about informal diplomacy, 
this paper will utilize a combination of recently declassified U.S. 
government documents, contemporary newspaper articles, and the 
memoirs of important individuals. By drawing from a wide vari-
ety of sources, this paper can thoroughly analyze this diplomatic 
moment. Each description of secret meetings, phone discussions, 
and policy decisions has been compared to other accounts by dif-
ferent authors with distinctive motivations and levels of retrospect. 
!is approach minimizes the discrepancies in each source’s details 
as well as complicating the accounts of the memoirs and the U.S. 
government memorandums. 
CASTRO REACHES OUT
By 1963, Guevara’s olive branch was largely forgotten in 
Washington as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated further. In De-
cember 1961, Castro openly referred to himself as a Marxist-Le-
ninist, and two months later the United States intensified its eco-
nomic embargo on Cuba. Eight months later, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis brought the United States to the brink of nuclear war with 
the Soviet Union. U.S.-Cuban relations were then at an all-time 
low. To Castro’s government, the United States solidified its posi-
tion as a militant imperialist power, while for the American public, 
Castro became a maniacal Soviet foot soldier.  
In this atmosphere of hostility, on April 30, 1963, Lisa How-
ard, a thirty-three year old ABC correspondent, returned from her 
groundbreaking weeklong trip to Havana.35 On her trip, Howard 
interviewed many high-ranking officials, including Raúl Castro and 
his wife Vilma Espín, Che Guevara, the foreign minister Raúl Roa 
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García, and Fidel Castro’s personal physician and confidant, Rene 
Vallejo. On April 22, Howard finally tracked down Castro, and the 
two talked for hours with Vallejo serving as an interpreter.36
!e interview took a turn Howard did not expect. Know-
ing that Howard had previously interviewed Khrushchev, Castro 
asked for her thoughts on his character. Howard responded that 
the Soviet Premier was a “shrewd politician who would break and 
dispose of Castro when the Soviets no longer needed him.”37 In 
the silence that followed, Castro simply nodded in what Howard 
believed was “skeptical agreement.”38 !en, without provocation, 
Castro mentioned that if the United States wanted to normalize 
relations with Cuba, then Kennedy would have to “make the first 
move.”39 When Howard responded that Castro might have to 
make the initial gesture, Castro said that “steps were already being 
taken” and that the U.S. simply needed to limit its sponsorship of 
exile raids for accommodation to move forward. Castro’s comments 
on rapprochement would be the greatest revelation that morning.
Howard filed a report that aired on May 10, 1963 detail-
ing her conversation with Castro. Howard’s account appeared to 
contradict what many in the United States had wrongly assumed. 
Castro was not staunchly opposed to the United States. Moreover, 
Howard was convinced of Castro’s honest intent, writing that his 
statements were “Surely [. . . ] not mere propaganda utterings.” Ac-
cording to Howard, Castro sought an end to the U.S. trade em-
bargo and desperately wanted independence from his Moscow 
patrons. She suggested that he was willing to make “substantial” 
concessions regarding the most inviolable roadblocks, including the 
presence of Soviet personnel in Cuba, compensation for expropri-
ated American property, and Cuba’s role as a revolutionary training 
ground.40 However, Howard counseled caution to American poli-
cymakers moving forward.
Castro is an intensely proud man and, therefore, hesitant about 
making a precise and formal bid for negotiations that might be 
rejected out of hand—particularly where the United States is 
concerned. . . .  Castro may be emotional and impulsive, but he 
is also a pragmatic politician. He knows that his one hope of 
15Journal of Politics & Society
gaining greater freedom from Moscow is through some sort of 
détente with the United States.41
Howard’s article encouraged the United States to pursue 
this opportunity. “In the absence of a better idea . . .  a little ver-
bal probing seems in order,” Howard wrote. “Why, then, should 
not the United States government profitably fish in these troubled 
waters?”42 If one trusts Howard’s assessment of Fidel Castro, it 
suggests that Castro exhibited the first signs of symbolic decision-
making. As an anti-U.S. nationalist, Castro could not openly pur-
sue normalization through standard diplomatic channels without 
losing his anti-imperialist reputation. Instead, he was obliged to 
communicate with the American government through informal 
proxies like Howard.
Howard’s televised report resonated in Washington. After it 
aired, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy Director Richard 
Helms reached out to the ABC journalist. Helms saw Howard’s ac-
count as an opportunity to collect intelligence on the Cuban auto-
crat.43 When Helms met Howard, the two pored over what Castro 
had said and its meaning for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations. 
Howard, who believed that Castro opened up to her because of her 
reputation as a “progressive,” was adamant that Castro was ready to 
negotiate with the United States. Castro was in complete control of 
Cuban policy and—despite the opposition of communists around 
him like his brother Raúl and Guevara—Castro wanted to open 
discussions. However, Howard had a more important message for 
Helms. “Howard definitely wants to impress the U.S. Government 
with two facts,” Helms wrote in a memorandum circulated to the 
CIA Director, U.S. Attorney General, and the National Security 
Advisor (NSA). “Castro is ready to discuss rapprochement and 
she herself is ready to discuss it with him if asked to do so by the 
U.S. Government.”44 If not her, Howard suggested sending other 
American representatives “progressive” enough to earn Castro’s 
trust.45
Based on their conversation, Helms came to a different con-
clusion about Castro and the situation in Cuba than Howard. 
Helms saw Castro as vulnerable and interpreted Castro’s message 
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to mean that the embargo was working and that “Cuba is in a state 
of economic chaos.”46 Helms began considering methods to assas-
sinate Castro. Pressing Howard on Cuba’s power structure, Helms 
concluded that Castro was the ultimate authority in Cuba, and that 
“neither Guevara nor Raúl Castro would be able to rule Cuba if 
Fidel were assassinated.”47 While Howard had stressed the pos-
sibility of rapprochement, the CIA was more concerned with the 
utility of U.S. embargos and assassinations.
A MOMENT OF FLEXIBILITY
In September 1963, William Hollingsworth Attwood was 
the United States’ Special Advisor on African Affairs to the Unit-
ed Nations.48 Attwood, a former journalist, had also interviewed 
Fidel Castro in 1959 as Castro’s international profile was rising. 
In their discussion about U.S. policy and the Cuban revolution, 
Attwood came to a few important conclusions. First, he was con-
vinced Castro was not a communist. Rather, over time, Castro 
developed his Marxist philosophy and fervent anti-Americanism 
due to U.S. covert action post-revolution. Second, because of the 
pronounced socioeconomic inequality of pre-revolutionary Cuba, 
American attempts to overthrow the revolution were bound to fail. 
For Cuba’s impoverished population, a government committed to 
social justice and economic empowerment trumped Cuba’s history 
of venal, kleptocratic regimes.49 Finally, Attwood believed that the 
United States should treat Castro with “benign indifference,” halt 
covert activities in Cuba, and discuss normalization.50 For his time, 
Attwood was progressive on matters of Cuban policy. Attwood’s 
personal experiences with Castro himself allowed his thinking to 
transcend the master narrative of the Cold War. To Attwood, Cas-
tro was an independent statesman, not a Soviet pawn. 
!at September, Howard’s article caught Attwood’s atten-
tion. In August, Attwood had met in New York with Seydon Dial-
lo, the Guinean Ambassador to Cuba, whom Attwood had known 
while serving in the Guinean capital Conakry. Diallo told Attwood 
that Castro was “unhappy with Cuba’s satellite status and (was) 
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looking for a way out.”51 Diallo, who had a personal conversation 
with the Cuban premier, said that Castro was interested in moving 
toward non-alignment. If the United States could simply end the 
exile raids on Cuba, Castro would be amenable to discussions.52 
Howard’s article helped confirm Diallo’s message and presented 
Attwood with a unique opportunity. He saw the prospect of talk-
ing with Castro once again, this time as a formal representative of 
the U.S. government. By 1963, Castro managed to reach the U.S. 
government with a message of peace through third party govern-
ment officials and members of the press.
On September 12, 1963, Attwood arranged to meet Lisa 
Howard in New York City under the pretense of discussing con-
temporary African affairs. Without prompting from Attwood, 
Howard brought up her meeting with Castro. She then offered to 
organize a party at her Manhattan apartment for Attwood to infor-
mally meet Carlos Lechuga, Cuba’s U.N. representative, whom she 
had previously met in Havana. Lechuga served as Castro’s ambas-
sador to Chile and Mexico and as a representative to the Organiza-
tion of American States.53 He also had a reputation as a moderate 
who would privately admit to holding suspicions about Marxism.54 
Attwood told Howard that he would consider the offer if she kept 
their conversation confidential. She agreed in exchange for exclu-
sivity if a story came out of the meeting. Attwood was intrigued, 
writing later “this could be a moment of flexibility.”55 
!at same day, Attwood discussed his findings with W. 
Averell Harriman, a Deputy Secretary of State, who asked him to 
write a memo detailing his thoughts. On September 17, Attwood 
talked again with Diallo in the Delegates Lounge. Diallo reiterated 
that Castro was amenable to a deal with the United States.56 On 
September 18, Attwood met with his U.N. superior, Adlai Ste-
venson, and advocated for “discreet contact” with the Cubans at 
the U.N. to judge Castro’s interest in discussions. Stevenson cau-
tioned Attwood that “the CIA (Special Group) is still in charge of 
Cuba,” but he offered to talk to Kennedy and suggested Attwood 
“pursue it quietly.”57 !e next day, Attwood met with Harriman 
in New York and showed him the memo. Harriman, sensitive to 
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the delicate nature of Attwood’s proposal, told Attwood to discuss 
the matter with Robert F. Kennedy, the president’s brother and the 
U.S. Attorney General.58 While arranging a meeting with Robert 
Kennedy, Attwood heard from Stevenson, who had spoken with 
President Kennedy when he visited the United Nations that day. 
!e president had approved Attwood to contact Lechuga, but was 
under strict orders to be “discreet.”59 Despite the informality of the 
discussions proposed by Attwood, the foreign policy bureaucracy 
still had to be maneuvered due to the sensitivity of the Cuban situ-
ation. Without approval from at least three different government 
superiors, Attwood was unable to officially make contact. Because 
of the importance of Cuba to U.S. foreign policy, administration 
officials were hesitant to advance too quickly.
With tentative approval, Attwood arranged with Howard to 
hold a cocktail party on September 23, 1963 at Howard’s apart-
ment on a tree-lined block of East 74th Street. On the day of the 
party, Howard approached Lechuga at the United Nations to invite 
him to the party. She said that some of Howard’s friends who had 
been to Cuba would be in attendance. !is group included William 
Attwood who urgently wanted to meet him.60 Lechuga agreed to 
make an appearance that evening, and when he arrived at the party, 
Howard promptly pulled him aside.61 She told him that Attwood 
wanted to see him immediately and ushered him toward the living 
room where the U.S. official was waiting. After greeting each other, 
the two men established that both were talking as private citizens. 
Attwood then told Lechuga that he was leaving for Washington, 
D.C. in a matter of hours, but wanted to discuss a potential visit to 
Havana. “He said that the situation was abnormal and that the ice 
would have to be broken sometime,” Lechuga remembered, calling 
Attwood “sincere.”62 Attwood also told Lechuga that, in his per-
sonal opinion, U.S. assassination plots against Castro were futile 
because he was too popular to overthrow. Instead, more concilia-
tory policies were appropriate.63
Attwood then brought up his diplomatic agenda by inquiring 
about the possibility of his making a visit to Cuba. Lechuga told 
Attwood that a trip might be a possibility and that Castro had been 
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intent on negotiations with Kennedy, but that the April 1961 Bay 
of Pigs invasion had derailed those plans.64 Recently, Castro had 
liked the tone of Kennedy’s speeches and had begun to think again 
about discussions. “At the time, I couldn’t tell (Attwood) anything 
specific,” Lechuga later wrote
But I said that my own view was that it would be difficult to ne-
gotiate in a situation of great pressure, such as there was in Cuba, 
with the economic blockade, the infiltration of saboteurs and the 
illegal flights. !at atmosphere would have to be changed if the 
two parties were to discuss things on an equal footing, although, 
I repeated, everything would depend on what the United States 
wanted.65
Attwood agreed that the negotiations would be complex. He 
also admitted that the political conditions were not ideal and would 
not change overnight because of the “prestige involved, but that dis-
cussions had to begin somewhere.”66 From Lechuga’s description 
of U.S.-Cuban relations, it becomes apparent that the revolution-
ary government did want to consider rapprochement, but that hos-
tile U.S. policies made any diplomacy nearly impossible.
Before the two men finished their discussion, Attwood re-
vealed the president’s gravest fear.67 Lechuga recalls Attwood say-
ing “that it wasn’t easy for the Democrats to change course on Cuba, 
because the Republicans always had them on the defensive on the 
issue . . .  Teasingly, he told me that if we thought Kennedy was 
our enemy, we should just imagine what Goldwater would do if he 
got to the White House.”68 Attwood knew that the symbolism of 
these negotiations was important for Kennedy’s reelection bid in 
1964. He continued saying that “people in the United States tended 
to see everything in terms of black and white, with no shadings.”69 
Attwood’s comments express the Kennedy administration’s phi-
losophy on the relationship between foreign policy and domestic 
politics. If Kennedy appeared to be “appeasing” Castro, his Republi-
can rivals, like Barry Goldwater, could label him “weak,” essentially 
scuttling his electability. !erefore, discussions would have to pro-
ceed with caution. Attwood told Lechuga that at the very least “an 
exchange of views might well be useful.”70 !ey would stay in touch 
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as Attwood maneuvered through the Washington bureaucracy.71
While Attwood began his efforts in New York, foreign poli-
cymakers in Washington, D.C. had already formulated a hardline 
anti-Castro policy. In a memorandum to the U.S. Congress on how 
to respond to constituent inquiries on U.S. policy toward Cuba, 
the White House took a militant position. !e memo reads, “our 
objective is a truly free Cuba. . . .  We want to get rid of Castro and 
the Communist influence there.”72 !ese goals included the with-
drawal of Soviet military forces, the isolation of Castro, and ag-
gravation of Cuba’s “serious economic difficulties.”73 In the minds 
of U.S. policymakers, Cuba’s threat to U.S. interests was its affilia-
tion with the Soviet Union. In the post-Missile Crisis era, United 
States’ policy revolved around preventing another nuclear standoff 
ninety miles off the Florida coast. Castro had become a liability not 
because of Cuban politics, but because of his role in a larger conflict 
between warring superpowers. 
To accomplish its objectives, the United States utilized a two-
prong policy prescription. According to the memo to Congress, 
first, the U.S. sought to weaken Cuba’s economy to precipitate Cas-
tro’s ultimate collapse at the hands of a disgruntled Cuban popula-
tion. Second, the U.S. Department of State and the CIA worked 
to strengthen anti-communist regimes in the surrounding region in 
nations like Guatemala. Other internal White House documents 
reveal that the United States had provided financial and organiza-
tional support to counterrevolutionary exiles working to destabi-
lize Castro’s government. !ese exile groups utilized terror tactics 
like destroying merchant vessels along Cuba’s shore and economic 
sabotage like bombing harbor facilities.74 Today, it is also known 
that the CIA engaged in numerous covert operations in Cuba in-
cluding Operation Mongoose, a program convened to assassinate 
Fidel Castro.75
However, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Cas-
tro’s resilience despite U.S. covert actions, Washington began to 
rethink its Cuban policy. Several weeks before Lisa Howard met 
Castro in Havana, Gordon Chase, a National Security Council 
(NSC) specialist on the Caribbean and Latin America, wrote an 
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options paper to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy.76 
In the memo titled “Cuba--Policy,” Chase wrote that the United 
States had only focused on undermining Castro through covert 
and overt “nastiness.” In tandem with the “nasty” policies, Chase ad-
vised adding what he termed the “sweet approach.”77 By creating a 
less militarized policy toward Castro, he argued, the United States 
could eliminate the two threats that he posed: Cuban “subversion” 
abroad (i.e. military support for insurgencies in countries like Co-
lombia and Mozambique) and the reintroduction of Soviet nuclear 
warheads into the Caribbean. Chase notes that “our present nasty 
policy is probably a necessary prelude to a sweet approach,” and 
that using both tactics might be the most expedient.78 However, 
under Chase’s policy paradigm, “enticing” Castro was still ultimate-
ly intended to eliminate the Cuban dictator. Chase’s memo shows 
that the White House was steadfast in its opposition to Castro, but 
nonetheless considered alternatives to open military confrontation. 
While the memo only represents a minor thawing of hostilities, it 
signals that the White House might have been genuinely receptive 
to Castro’s overtures.
Hours after Howard’s party, at the Department of Justice 
in Washington, D.C., Attwood and Robert Kennedy discussed 
Attwood’s memo and his conversation with Lechuga the previous 
evening. After hearing Attwood’s report, Kennedy told him that 
he would discuss it with McGeorge Bundy.79 Kennedy feared that 
“it was bound to leak—and if nothing came of it the Republicans 
would call it appeasement and demand a congressional investiga-
tion.”80 However, Kennedy approved maintaining contact with Le-
chuga and suggested Attwood propose a meeting in another loca-
tion like Mexico or at the U.N. in New York.81 
!ree days later Attwood ran into Lechuga in the Delegates 
Lounge at the U.N.—a place Attwood said was “always a good 
place for discreet encounters because of its noise and confusion.”82 
Lechuga was doing a television interview with Howard when 
Attwood entered. !e two men greeted each other and Attwood 
related what he had heard at the Department of Justice. Under 
present circumstances, Attwood said he would be unable to travel 
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to Cuba because of his official government status. However, he said 
that “we were prepared to meet (Castro) and listen wherever else 
would be convenient” if Cuba was willing to send an emissary.83 
Lechuga said that he would discuss the matter with Castro and 
warned Attwood that he would be making a “hard” anti-American 
speech at the U.N. but that he should “not take it seriously.”84 
Attwood was not pleased, but Lechuga was adamant: as long as the 
U.S. blockade was in place, he had no choice.85 Even though both 
the Cuban and United States governments privately acted with de-
corum, publically their statecraft was still critical and adversarial. 
Nearly two weeks after Lechuga delivered an anti-U.S. address 
on the U.N. floor—to which Adlai Stevenson, the United States 
Ambassador to the U.N., acidly responded days later—Attwood 
was at a New York dinner hosted by Agnes Elizabeth Meyer, the 
widow of the late publisher of the Washington Post, Eugene Isaac 
Meyer. At dinner, Attwood talked with the Greek architect Con-
stantinos Apostolou Doxiadis who had just returned from an ar-
chitecture conference in Havana. C.A. Doxiadis, who had been in 
contact with Guevara and Castro, told Attwood that he was con-
vinced that Castro wanted to normalize relations with the United 
States.86 Attwood had now heard from four reliable sources that 
Castro’s interests were genuine. !e possibility for rapprochement 
was a reality.87 In this moment of informal diplomacy, the im-
portance of third party messengers cannot be overstated. Castro 
communicated with the U.S. government through prominent pri-
vate citizens like Howard and Doxiadis as well as diplomats like 
Seydon Diallo. Because none of these individuals had direct ties 
to the U.S. government they could pass messages without entan-
gling themselves in the symbolic web of American electoral politics. 
AN ALTERNATIVE PATH
Despite these positive steps toward negotiations, both How-
ard and Attwood were skeptical about Lechuga’s ability to transmit 
the United States’ message to Castro. In New York, Howard told 
Attwood that Lechuga’s message might not make it past the for-
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eign office due to the anti-U.S. bloc’s influence in the Cuban gov-
ernment. Instead of relying on Lechuga, Howard suggested con-
tacting Dr. Rene Vallejo, Castro’s closest advisor. Vallejo held no 
official position but was constantly at Castro’s side acting as both 
a translator and secretary for the prime minister.88 Howard had 
stayed in contact with Vallejo by phone since interviewing him 
in Havana, and believed he supported Castro’s mission of peace. 
!rough Vallejo, Howard could guarantee that “Castro knew there 
was a U.S. official available if he wanted to talk.”89 Howard’s con-
cerns reveal that Castro’s control over Cuba was more tenuous 
than assumed by many scholars. Far from the totalitarian ruler of 
American nightmares, Castro’s government was rife with dissent, 
exposing a level of fragility heretofore unrecognized. According to 
Howard, even Castro’s own policymakers could not transmit mes-
sages without facing internal opposition to his dictates.90 Finally, 
Lechuga’s inability to access Castro points to a deeper concern with 
informal diplomacy, namely that messages can only travel as far as 
their bearer’s influence extends.  
At this point, in October 1963, Attwood approved Howard’s 
plan to contact Vallejo with one condition. He wanted it made 
clear that “we were not soliciting a meeting but only expressing a 
willingness to listen to anything they had to say.”91 Attwood came 
to understand that he operated on a symbolic minefield and that 
caution was a virtue. If the negotiations appeared too amicable or 
to have emanated from the U.S., they would be stigmatized as “ap-
peasement” and become fodder for a Republican attack in the com-
ing 1964 presidential election. Embedded in Attwood’s concerns 
was the paradox of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. U.S. officials 
feared the symbolism of appearing to “appease” Castro, but could 
see the symbolic victory in removing Cuba from the Soviet sphere 
of influence. Public knowledge of discussions was anathema to 
their interest, but severing the Soviet-Cuban relationship was the 
ultimate prize.
Howard and Vallejo connected on October 29, 1963. Vallejo 
reassured Howard that “Castro still felt as he did in April about 
improving relations with (the United States),” but that Castro, 
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who wanted to conduct the discussions himself, could not leave the 
country at that time.92 Vallejo agreed to tell Castro that there was a 
U.S. official “authorized to listen to him.”93 !ree days later, Vallejo 
called Howard again with an alternative proposal that Attwood de-
scribed in a memo:
He said Castro would very much like to talk to the U.S. offi-
cial anytime and appreciated the importance of discretion to all 
concerned. Castro would therefore be willing to send a plane to 
Mexico to pick up the official and fly him to a private airport 
near Veradero [sic.] where Castro would talk to him alone. !e 
plane would fly him back immediately after the talk. In this way 
there would be no risk of identification at Havana airport.94
Howard informed Vallejo that this plan was not likely to be 
accepted by the United States. As an alternative, she suggested that 
a Castro spokesman meet a U.S. official in Mexico or at the U.N., 
believing the Americans would be more amenable to those condi-
tions. Vallejo would not rule out such an alternative method.95 !e 
next day, Howard informed Attwood who then relayed the infor-
mation to Chase, Attwood’s White House contact.96 In the brief-
ing, Chase and Attwood agreed that President Kennedy “could see 
the political advantage of possibly weaning Castro away from the 
Soviet fold,” even if the Department of State did not.97 Attwood’s 
memoir reveals the disaggregated nature of foreign policy making 
in the U.S. government. Even within the executive branch, the pres-
ident was only one voice out of many attempting to make disparate 
interests into a single, cohesive policy.
While Howard connected with Vallejo, Attwood ran into Le-
chuga in the U.N. Delegates Lounge on October 28, 1963. Lechuga 
told Attwood that Havana did not want to engage in formal talks 
at the U.N.98 Despite these reservations, Lechuga suggested that 
“informal chats from time to time” would be acceptable and that he 
was still open to having a U.S. official like Attwood visit Castro in 
Cuba.99 Attwood agreed to keep their channels of communication 
open and told Lechuga it was his prerogative to reinitiate a conver-
sation. While contact continued, the negotiations had momentarily 
stalled due to a disagreement over location.
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By late 1963, the Kennedy White House had to decide 
Attwood’s next assignment. On November 5, McGeorge Bundy 
informed President Kennedy of Attwood’s work and his standing 
invitation to travel to Cuba. As his top national security advisor, 
Bundy told the president that “it’s as good a place as any for covert 
contact” and that Attwood would be able to move forward with ne-
gotiations easily because of his established relationship with Cas-
tro.100 Even so, Bundy was particularly worried about Attwood’s 
“close” relationship with the White House and the potential for 
Attwood’s involvement becoming politically dangerous. Bundy 
offered to stall the talks and remove Attwood from the U.S. pay-
roll for deniability purposes. Kennedy agreed that separating him 
from the payroll was an appropriate solution. However, Kennedy 
expressed to Bundy that, “I’d, we’d, need some explanation for why 
Attwood’s there” if the press heard about it.101 Bundy believed that 
the White House should prepare a hypothetical cover story that it 
had simply responded to a Cuban initiative “to see what the terms 
and conditions surrendered were.” Kennedy agreed and asked 
Bundy “if he were off the payroll is there any hesitation in going to 
Cuba?”102 Bundy needed to clear it with the White House Coun-
sel and the “newsman” first, but appeared comfortable with the pos-
sibility. !is meeting shows that Kennedy and Bundy were serious 
about opening up negotiations with Cuba provided that public per-
ception was controlled. !ey discussed at length the importance of 
contingency plans, secrecy, and plausible deniability. Indeed, how 
to distance themselves from Attwood if the negotiations were to 
leak to the press appears to have been Kennedy’s paramount fear in 
approving informal negotiations.103
On November 12, Howard told Attwood that Vallejo had 
called again. !is time Vallejo suggested that Attwood come to 
Varadero, Cuba on a U.S. plane leaving from Key West, Florida. 
He argued that this scenario would attract less attention than a 
Cuban plane entering American airspace. Attwood deferred to 
Bundy on how to proceed. In a phone conversation, Bundy told 
Attwood that the president still only approved preliminary agenda 
discussions outside of Cuba. In the meantime, Bundy wrote, in a 
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memorandum for the record, that Attwood should make it clear to 
Vallejo that Cuba had two policies 
Which are flatly unacceptable to us: namely, . . . (1) submis-
sion to external Communist influence, and (2) a determined 
campaign of subversion directed at the rest of the Hemisphere 
[sic.]. Reversal of these policies may or may not be sufficient to 
produce a change in the policy of the United States, but they 
are certainly necessary, and without an indication of readiness 
to move in these directions, it is hard for us to see what could be 
accomplished by a visit to Cuba.104
Bundy stressed one more point. Attwood was to make it 
his priority to reinforce that the United States was neither a “sup-
plicant” nor had it initiated the contact.105 Bundy, like Attwood, 
knew the importance of perception. !e ultimate fate of the nego-
tiations did not depend on the substance, rather it hinged on the 
ability of the U.S. government to frame the public narrative.
Bundy’s message addressed negotiations, but took a militant 
stance. !e closer to the president U.S. officials were, the warier 
of appeasement they appeared in their language. Strong demands, 
in other words, took the place of unilateral concessions or expres-
sions of friendship in these initial messages from the United States. 
Moreover, Bundy’s message to Vallejo through Attwood reveals 
that the process of agreeing on the terms of an initial discussion in-
volved a transmission of substantive diplomacy. Even as the details 
of a rapprochement remained in doubt, Bundy, Attwood, Vallejo, 
and Castro all exchanged ideas, terms of negotiation, and other 
diplomatic information. Indeed, informal diplomacy opened an 
initial dialogue without the formal trappings of a well-orchestrat-
ed, formal meeting.
Because Kennedy was still uncomfortable sending a U.S. 
official to Cuba, Vallejo decided to accept Attwood’s earlier com-
promise. In a phone conversation, Vallejo said that Castro would 
send Lechuga instructions on how to proceed with formulating an 
agenda with Attwood at the U.N. !ese talks would pave the way 
for later, formal diplomatic talks about normalization, Vallejo said. 
Calling Bundy later that morning, Attwood informed him that the 
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agenda negotiations were within reach. Attwood was instructed to 
return to Washington in order to discuss the U.S. message to Cas-
tro. 
In late November 1963, the respective governments of Ken-
nedy and Castro were on the verge of breaking an icy two-year 
diplomatic silence. At this particular moment in 1963, meaning-
ful diplomatic discussions, however informal, were only days away. 
While the outcome of the agenda discussions remained in doubt, 
the process of normalization had begun. Castro and Kennedy had 
found an informal, symbolically acceptable location and a pair of 
negotiators for moving towards a normal diplomatic relationship. 
A FRENCH MESSENGER OF PEACE
French journalist Jean Daniel also found himself at the center 
of a vague, indirect diplomatic exchange between the two adver-
sarial states. On October 3, 1963 Attwood had lunch in New York 
with Daniel, an old friend and editor for the French newsweekly 
L’Observateur. !e two men chatted and Daniel told Attwood that 
he was soon to depart for Havana where he planned to interview 
Castro. Intrigued by the possibility of Daniel acting as another 
unconventional diplomatic conduit, Attwood suggested that Dan-
iel see President Kennedy before departing for Havana. !at day, 
Attwood called his friend Ben Bradlee, Newsweek’s Washington 
bureau chief at the time.106 After covering the 1960 presidential 
campaign, Bradlee was a close acquaintance of the president and 
visited the White House regularly.107 Bradlee discussed the matter 
with President Kennedy who agreed to see Daniel.
A meeting took place between Kennedy and Daniel in the late 
afternoon on !ursday, October 24, 1963 during which Kennedy 
shocked Daniel with his understanding of the Cuban situation.108 
After a few minutes of pleasantries, Kennedy told Daniel that:
I believe there is no country in the world . . .  where economic 
colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in 
Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the [Fulgen-
cio] Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufac-
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tured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without real-
izing it. . . .  I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. 
I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the 
Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and espe-
cially yearning to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: 
to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a 
number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall 
have to pay for those sins.109
Kennedy, however, continued, arguing that:
It is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, 
and has become international. . . .  I know that Castro betrayed 
the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed 
to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his 
fault—either his ‘will to independence,’ his madness or Commu-
nism—the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 
1962. . . . In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going 
to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Com-
munist subversion.110
Reflecting on the meeting, Daniel later wrote that he believed 
the president was looking for a way out of the stagnant diplomatic 
relationship with Cuba.111 A socialist who felt sympathetic to the 
Cubans suffering under the U.S. embargo, Daniel knew he had a 
mission to help open a dialogue between Castro and Kennedy.112 
It is clear from this conversation that President Kennedy had 
a more sympathetic and sophisticated understanding of the Cuban 
situation than the content of his public speeches exposed. With 
Daniel, the president spoke with maturity, frankness, and historical 
insight. Nonetheless, the president remained committed to his cold 
warrior public persona: Cuba was a Soviet proxy, and he would not 
negotiate with Khrushchev’s !ird World acolytes. In fact, Ken-
nedy’s treatment of Castro was patronizing and confrontational 
despite his more conciliatory sentiments toward the revolution’s 
origins.
Daniel left for Havana days later. Arriving in the Cuban capi-
tal, he talked with farmers, intellectuals, counter-revolutionaries, 
ambassadors, and government ministers. But Castro proved elu-
sive. For three weeks, Daniel sought the prime minister without 
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finding him. A government official finally told him that Castro’s 
workload was so heavy due to a recent hurricane that the Cuban 
leader would not be able to speak with journalists. Disappointed, 
Daniel was poised to fly to Mexico the next day when Castro ar-
rived at his hotel. !e prime minister had heard about Daniel’s in-
terview with President Kennedy and immediately sought out the 
French journalist.113 
!e two men spoke at length throughout the evening of No-
vember 18, 1963, the same night that Attwood and Vallejo agreed 
on an introductory agenda discussion. Daniel described his conver-
sation with President Kennedy and claims that he expected Cas-
tro to react critically. However, he was surprised that Castro took 
Kennedy’s words at face value. After a pause, Castro said, “I believe 
Kennedy is sincere.” 
I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could 
have political significance. . . .  I haven’t forgotten that Kennedy 
centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of 
firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian 
tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at invasion, the pres-
sures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, 
the blockade, and above everything, all the retaliatory measures 
which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext 
and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult 
situation; I don’t think that a President of the United States is 
ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the 
impact of this lack of freedom. . . .  I also think he is a realist: he is 
now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and 
cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, 
to disappear.114
He told Daniel that he was a “peace lover” who wanted the 
United States to acknowledge the existence of socialism in Latin 
America and learn to coexist. To do so would take political forti-
tude on the part of the U.S. president, but it would be a welcome 
change in policy. Finally, according to Daniel, Castro gave his mes-
sage to be carried back to Kennedy:
Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of see-
ing that it is not in the United States’ interest to pursue a policy 
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which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, 
everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual 
respect of sovereignty. . . .  Since you are going to see Kennedy 
again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make 
myself clear: I don’t want anything, I don’t expect anything, and 
as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. 
But as a man and a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the 
bases of understanding could be.115
If Kennedy were able to accomplish this change in philoso-
phy, he would be a greater president than Abraham Lincoln, Castro 
concluded.116 However, Castro was convinced that Kennedy could 
not negotiate until after his 1964 re-election campaign. Accord-
ing to Daniel’s account of the meeting, Castro appeared thoughtful, 
tense, but cordial.117 Afterwards, Castro had the French journalist 
stay in Cuba to continue their discussion. 
Substantively, the messages of both Castro and Kennedy 
were both peaceful and progressive. Both leaders’ language pro-
vides evidence that they genuinely sought normalization. However, 
Kennedy had to contend with the importance of his relationship 
to the voting public. Embedded within his anti-Soviet message to 
Castro is this public perception imperative. While rapprochement 
may have appeared expedient in private, the looming shadow of the 
U.S. presidential election and American fears of foreign commu-
nism presented difficult roadblocks to peace.
THE DEATH OF A PRESIDENT
Earlier the same day, Air Force One landed at Miami Inter-
national Airport with President Kennedy on board. At the end of 
a three-day speaking tour through Florida, Kennedy had one last 
stop to make in Miami.118 On the campaign trail, Kennedy had a 
comfortable sixteen-point lead among moderates—who many be-
lieved would be pivotal in 1964—over the presumptive Republican 
nominee, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater.119 After arriving from 
Tampa where he had addressed union leaders and the chamber of 
commerce, Kennedy gave a speech to the Inter-American Press As-
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sociation, which would be broadcast in Cuba.120 !at night, the 
president discussed his broader vision for Latin America. Kenne-
dy told the congregated journalists that “the hard reality of life in 
much of Latin America, will not be solved simply by complaining 
about Castro, by blaming all problems on communism, or generals, 
or nationalism.”121 Rather, Kennedy argued, issues like low adult 
literacy and life expectancy, poverty, and stagnant incomes could 
be overcome with development programs. Kennedy portrayed the 
hemisphere’s issues as conquerable with the right influx of capital, 
commitment from developed nations, and political democracy. Fi-
nally, Kennedy had a direct message about Castro.
. . .  A small band of conspirators has . . . made Cuba a victim of 
foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, [and] 
a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the 
other American republics. !is, and this alone divides us. As 
long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything 
is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and 
anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those pro-
gressive goals which a few short years ago stirred their hopes and 
the sympathy of many people throughout the Hemisphere.122
Kennedy’s speech struck a peaceful note, but perpetuated the 
same Soviet proxy argument that Dillon had laid out two years be-
fore in Uruguay. In public, the president was unwilling to acknowl-
edge Castro’s independence or the possibility of rapprochement. 
Ending his speech to applause, Kennedy flew back to Washington. 
He would only have two days before flying to Texas for a planned 
tour of four cities, including Dallas.123
On November 22, 1963, Jean Daniel and Castro sat eating 
lunch at the premier’s Varadero beach home on the Cuban north 
shore. While conversing in the living room, a secretary dressed in 
a taupe military uniform told Castro that Osvaldo Dorticós, the 
President of the Cuban Republic, was on the phone and needed to 
talk with Castro. !e prime minister went to the phone, listened, 
and then announced to the room that Kennedy had been shot in 
Dallas. Finding out all he could, Castro returned to his seat and 
said three times “es una mala noticia” (“this is bad news”). !e rest 
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of the day, Castro stayed close to a radio tuned to the NBC network 
broadcasting from Miami. !at night, Kennedy was pronounced 
dead, at which point Castro remarked, “everything has changed. . . . 
All will have to be rethought.”124 A few days later, Daniel returned 
to the United States. He was convinced that Castro still wanted 
rapprochement. Attwood called Arthur M. Schlesinger, a White 
House aide, and the National Security Council’s Gordon Chase 
to arrange an appointment for Daniel and Bundy.125 It is unclear 
whether this meeting ever occurred.126 With Kennedy dead, the 
negotiations would have to be re-thought by a new U.S. president.
 
JOHNSON RISES TO POWER
According to Attwood, the United States began to let the ne-
gotiations during Johnson’s presidency. In a memorandum to Bun-
dy shortly after Kennedy’s assassination, Chase laid out the United 
States’ options in the new international and domestic political cli-
mate. He wrote that if Bundy and Johnson believed the chances of 
normalization had diminished since Kennedy’s assassination, then 
Attwood’s discussions were moot. However, he advised Bundy to 
continue to pursue negotiations, but cautiously. “While November 
22 events probably make accommodation an even tougher issue 
for President Johnson than it was for President Kennedy,” Chase 
wrote,
A preliminary Attwood-Lechuga talk still seems worthwhile 
from our point of view – if the Cubans initiate it. We have little 
or nothing to lose and there will be some benefits; at a mini-
mum, we should get a valuable reading as to what Castro regards 
as negotiable . . .  and a hint as to how he views the effects of 
November 22 on Cuban/U.S. relations.127
Chase then urged that the president make a decision quickly, 
citing Adlai Stevenson’s “activist tendencies” and his willingness to 
act without White House approval.
Nonetheless, Chase was acutely aware of the nearly uncon-
querable obstacles between the United States and Cuba. In the 
aforementioned memo, Chase wrote that “a new President [sic.] 
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who has no background of being successfully aggressive toward 
Castro and the communists (e.g. President Kennedy in October, 
1962) would probably run a greater risk of being accused, by the 
American people, of ‘going soft.’”128 Chase knew that while Ken-
nedy established his cold warrior bona fides by militantly opposing 
Castro, Johnson had yet to establish his credentials amongst the 
electorate, the media, and his partisan opponents. Indeed, Chase’s 
memo encapsulates the essence of the presidential foreign policy 
drama: in which rational foreign policy decisions were subject to 
a series of symbolic assessments. Regardless of American interest 
abroad, a president’s foreign policy decision-making process was 
minimized without a national reputation of virile strength.
On November 29, 1963, having not heard from the White 
House, Attwood told Howard—who was scheduled to call Le-
chuga that day—that he had no new instructions.129 On De-
cember 2, 1963, Lechuga let Attwood know that he had received 
authorization from Vallejo to talk “in general terms” and asked 
if Attwood had heard from the White House. He had not. Two 
days later, Lechuga told Attwood that he had received a letter with 
Castro’s instructions for an initial agenda dialogue. Attwood called 
Chase again who, on the verge of a substantive discussion with the 
Cubans, delivered the coup de grâce. All policies were under re-
view, be patient.130 On December 12, Attwood and Lechuga spoke 
again, with Attwood left with no choice but to echo Chase: be pa-
tient. !e brief conversation was the last the two men had for many 
years.131
!at same week, President Johnson reassured the General 
Assembly of the United Nations that he would be carrying on Ken-
nedy’s foreign policy. Afterward, Johnson approached Attwood and 
told him that he had read “with interest” a memorandum Attwood 
had written about his work with Lechuga and Vallejo.132 Some-
what relieved, Attwood did not believe Johnson would terminate 
the talks. !e United States had too much to gain, and he was 
on the brink of discussing substance with Lechuga. At the time, 
Attwood did not know that the first words Johnson uttered as 
president about Cuba were to John McCone, Director of the Cen-
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tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), asking how he planned to “dispose 
of Castro.”133 !e president was more concerned with Vietnam, 
his bold domestic policy ambitions, and the potential electoral di-
saster represented by a failure to normalize with Cuba gracefully. 
Even with majorities in both chambers of Congress, the potential 
for failure left Johnson unwilling to approve negotiations. 
A FLICKER OF HOPE
After a long period of internal White House silence, Adlai 
Stevenson, in an attempt to revive the negotiations, laid out the 
basic chronology of events that transpired under his leadership at 
the United Nations in a memorandum to President Johnson. In 
conclusion, Stevenson wrote:
While I am not sanguine that anything will come of this, (How-
ard) is convinced that (Castro) sincerely wants some channel of 
communication. If it could be resumed on a low enough level to 
avoid any possible embarrassment, it might be worth consider-
ing. I am sure it cannot be done through the usual channels.134
Like Lechuga and Attwood before him, Stevenson knew that 
the greatest impediment to negotiation was public perception.
!e last attempt at negotiation came from Fidel Castro. On 
February 12, 1964, Howard returned to Havana to film another 
ABC special. Once again, she had a conversation with Castro who 
sent a direct message to President Johnson. !e Cuban premier 
spoke with unprecedented directness. In his message, Castro said 
that there “are no [sic.] areas of contention between us that cannot 
be discussed and settled.” Continuing, Castro commended the “po-
litical courage” the U.S. had shown in initiating these discussions 
and expressed his interest in continuing based on the agenda he 
had transmitted to Lechuga. Castro also offered Johnson a defen-
sive political option.
If the President feels it necessary during the [Presidential] cam-
paign to make bellicose statements about Cuba or even to take 
some hostile action – if he will inform me, unofficially, that a 
specific action is required because of domestic political consid-
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erations, I shall understand and not take any serious retaliatory 
action.135
Castro finished his message with an oath of silence: “I have 
revealed nothing at that time. . . .  I have revealed nothing since . . .  I 
would reveal nothing now.”136 If Johnson needed reassurance that 
he had a willing partner in negotiations, Castro’s message should 
have assuaged any such concerns. 
However, Johnson had to contend with Barry Goldwater. 
Emboldened by his Republican frontrunner status, Goldwater—
who was already on the record saying that Cuba was “a cancer eat-
ing away at the security of the entire hemisphere”—took a militant 
stance in criticizing Johnson’s handling of the Caribbean nation.137 
In front of 3,000 supporters in Chicago, Illinois, Goldwater said 
that Johnson “may talk our security to death:”
How long can this administration hide its head in the sand and 
say that we have to get along with communism in this world? 
Today we do not have brinkmanship. We have backmanship and 
we do business with murderers who would destroy us.138
Goldwater advocated tightening the embargo, dispatch-
ing Marines to Cuba, and training an exile paramilitary force for 
another invasion.139 Goldwater’s rhetorical war against Johnson 
jeopardized the presidential incumbent less than a year after John-
son took office.
!e last time that negotiations were discussed was July 7, 
1964. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Gordon Chase 
wrote that while he was “in favor of having a channel to Castro,” 
Lisa Howard had become a liability. Her role as a journalist made 
the White House uneasy. As Chase wrote, by removing Howard he 
would feel “somewhat safer,” because Adlai Stevenson, her new con-
tact since Attwood’s redeployment as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, 
was a “far sexier” contact from “a public media point of view” than 
Attwood.140 Once again, Chase clearly exposes the United States’ 
cardinal concern with Cuban negotiations. Because of the symbolic 
power of Cuba as an enemy of the state, any press story about nego-
tiation could lead to the label of “softness” and appeasement, which 
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was anathema to Johnson’s nascent presidency. Moreover, these jus-
tifications were made in the language of performance. Stevenson, a 
trustworthy and nationally important political surrogate, was too 
“sexy” to be caught negotiating with Castro publically.141 Despite 
the real benefits of communication, it was the powerful importance 
of image that trumped all other considerations.
With Howard’s eventual removal, communication between 
the two states essentially ended. Although Castro attempted to 
reach out to the United States through an interview with !e New 
York Times’ Richard Eder, and Howard arranged for Guevara to 
meet with U.S. Senator Eugene McCarthy in New York, negotia-
tions had largely fallen apart in Attwood’s absence.142 While John-
son ended the CIA covert assassination plots in Cuba that year, 
his attention was largely turned to Vietnam and, as a result, the 
work done by Attwood, Howard, Chase, Lechuga, and Vallejo was 
largely forgotten. 
CONCLUSION
As the Castro-Kennedy conversations receded into history, 
the potential for U.S.-Cuban peace disappeared as well. While 
Henry Kissinger under President Gerald Ford attempted to nor-
malize relations—and President Jimmy Carter momentarily did—
no U.S. president was able to create a robust peace with Castro 
that transcended the Cold War and the centuries of patron-client 
relations.143 Despite this diplomatic disappointment, numerous 
lessons can be gleaned from the wreckage of what Attwood once 
called “an episode in American foreign policy best described as a 
comedy of errors that wasn’t always very funny.”144
Most saliently, the Johnson administration’s failure to reach 
rapprochement stems from the cult of the cold warrior that each 
president aspired to emulate. Because of electoral pressure and do-
mestic perception, no U.S. president could afford to be perceived 
as weak on communism. In a world where capitalist democracy 
was believed to be under communist siege, battlegrounds like Cuba 
took on greater importance in this symbolic scramble for legitimacy. 
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!us, successive U.S. presidents perpetuated aggressive, militarized 
foreign policy doctrines—what Greg Grandin calls “muscular in-
ternationalism”—to prove their anti-communist qualifications.145 
Johnson was unable to pursue a durable peace with Castro because 
he had not demonstrated to the electorate that he was a cold warrior 
with masculine, militarist qualifications. !is White House dogma 
was so overwhelming that presidents were willing to disregard the 
sage advice of their foreign policy advisers. Fear drove these leaders 
toward timid policies. !erefore, rapprochement would have ne-
cessitated either a long-tenured U.S. commander-in-chief with a 
warrior-president persona, or one whose political philosophy tran-
scended the Cold War power calculus and its psychological side 
effects. At its essence, the aesthetic dangers of normalization were 
the greatest impediment to negotiation. !is symbolic battlefield 
proves that U.S. presidents do not have ultimate authority over 
foreign policy. In many ways, they are politically feeble—captive to 
their own political ascendency. To paraphrase Fidel Castro himself, 
no U.S. president was ever truly free to make his own decisions.146
Moreover, the Cuban Revolution was wildly popular within 
Cuba itself. Built on a platform of anti-Americanism, nationalist 
sentiments underwrote Castro’s budding political power. !ere-
fore, to reach a rapprochement or admit to initiating discussions 
with the United States would embolden the dissenting elements in 
his own government and undermine his authority as an exemplar of 
nationalist pride. !e symbolic trap of the Cold War left both sides 
subject to its symbolic requirements. However, time and again, the 
Cuban premier transparently expressed interest and made unilat-
eral gestures. Castro , in this narrative, is not a capricious dictator, 
but a rational statesman in pursuit of peace.
Furthermore, these failed negotiations expose informal diplo-
macy’s power and limits. Unbridled by the dictates of elected office, 
mid-level government officials and journalists proved to be power-
ful negotiation surrogates for the United States and Cuba. In the 
U.S. government’s neurotic attempts to avoid the large-scale em-
barrassment of appearing to “appease” Castro, informal diplomacy 
offered an ideal method to disassociate with the prime participants 
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in the case of failure. Officials, like William Attwood, who held 
little political relevance, yet were connected with both the govern-
ment and the press became integral to the process. Attwood espe-
cially could thrive in the liminal spaces between the government 
and the press, having worked in both professions. He could move 
seamlessly between his contacts in Cuba, the White House, and 
the United Nations without ruffling the hypersensitive feathers of 
figureheads like McGeorge Bundy or Adlai Stevenson. Howard 
played a similar role as intermediary. She was both an interloper 
and insider in all social and political circles. !rough diplomatic 
sessions over cocktails, chance encounters in the chaotic halls of 
the U.N., furtive international phone calls, and early morning inter-
views in Havana, the White House and Castro found a system of 
clandestine contact by which low-level discussions could resonate 
up to the highest offices.
However, these failed negotiations also exhibit informal di-
plomacy’s greatest weakness: its precarious, unofficial status. Infor-
mal diplomacy may avoid the risk of political scandal and symbolic 
setback, but its characteristic discretion makes it easily derailed 
by innuendo or political whim. With a change of the president or 
even a single intra-agency promotion, the delicate web of personal 
relations and trust that support informal diplomacy can collapse. 
Howard and Attwood’s diplomatic channels were at the mercy of 
a handful of capricious, anti-communist officials. Similarly, Cas-
tro and his personal perception of the U.S. president controlled 
Lechuga and Vallejo. Indeed, the fact that informal diplomacy re-
quires an unwavering champion is both its paramount strength as 
well as its tragic flaw.
It is also clear from this moment that different bureaucratic 
self-interests affect and distort foreign policy. Each government 
institution—the CIA, U.N., State Department, Department of 
Justice, and National Security Council—has a raison d’être. For 
example, the CIA evolved into a covert operations clearinghouse 
while the United Nations was chartered as an instrument of in-
ternational communication and deliberation. Naturally, in dealing 
with foreign policy dilemmas, each department approached policy 
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questions based on its functional responsibility. Hence, the CIA’s 
Richard Helms perceived weakness in Castro’s message and advo-
cated for more covert operations to undermine his regime. On the 
other hand, United Nation officials like Attwood and Stevenson 
believed that open communication could yield amicable relations. 
Also, because all government departments are subject to a prerog-
ative of power, each sought to turn their ideas into policy. !ese 
functional discrepancies create a maddening array of interests and 
conclusions that can cloud proper presidential decision-making.
As this paper has shown, throughout the period from 1961 
to 1964, there was a sincere U.S. effort to open up diplomatic rela-
tions with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Out of Kennedy’s approval of un-
conditional agenda discussions, one can infer genuine interest on 
the part of the United States government. While cynical scholars 
may claim that Kennedy’s motives were Machiavellian and only in-
tended to provide valuable information to the CIA, this paper’s re-
search strongly suggests that the Kennedy administration wanted 
durable peace. Whether these efforts “failed” or were never an au-
thentic possibility may never be known; the entire affair is a lesson 
in historical contingency. Regardless of intention, the unpredict-
ability of a complicated, capricious world can always intercede in 
both war and diplomacy.
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